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AGENCY COSTS AND THE PERFORMANCE IMPLICATIONS
OF INTERNATIONAL JOINT VENTURE INTERNALIZATION
Recent studies have examined the detenninants of international joint venture (IN) fonnations and stock
market reactions to such investments. Less is known, however, about the evolution of INs and the attendant
perfonnance implications for parent firms. This paper examines one specific type of IN evolution, IN
internalization, whereby one finn acquires the IN by buying out its partner(s). Standard agency theory variables
are hypothesized to influence parent finn valuation effects. The results indicate that parent finn valuation effects
are positively related to the parent finn equity owned by insiders and the interaction of debt financing and free cash
flow.
--------- ..._---_._------.--------_.__._.- - _.. _._--------_ .._--_..
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AGENCY COSTS AND THE PERFORMANCE IMPLICAnONS
OF INTERNATIONAL JOINT VENTURE INTERNALIZAnON
Previous research presents seemingly contradictory evidence regarding the parent fInn performance
implications of joint venture (N) investments. Event studies generally fInd a positive shareholder wealth effect
associated with venture formation: However, Ns frequently fail to meet parent fInns' objectives (e.g., Beamish,
1985; see Kogut, 1988b for a review), and are often unstable and short-lived.2 While scholars have typically
associated IV longevity with collaborative success and IV termination with failure,3 evidence is beginning to come
forward indicating that IV termination need not reflect parent fInn failure. For example, sales of venture stakes
may reflect changes in parent fIrms'corporate strategies rather than prospects for the individual IV (Bleeke &
Ernst, 1993). Moreover, IV learning can reveal favorable expansion opportunities that promote venture
internalization (Inkpen, 1995; Ittner & Kogut, 1995).
Recent event studies of IV formations suggest agency theory may be useful for isolating the sources of
- ----- ---- -_. -- -- - - --------- - -- - -- - --
------------- --. - pareriffum vaIUatioiierfectSliom-N -investrnentS.-iee-and Wyatt(i990)-co~j~t;-~d- that agency problems may be
at the root of the negative shareholder wealth effects for the international joint venture (IIV) formations they
studied. Consistent with agency theory predictions, empiric~ research has found that parent fInn inside ownership
is positively related to stock price movements associated with IV formations (Cordeiro, 1993; Wild, 1994). This
fInding suggests that better IV investment decisions are made when managers' and shareholders' fInancial
interests coincide. Wild (1994) observed that IIV formations also create more wealth for parent fIrm shareholders
when parent fIrms have low levels of free cash flow or have high fInancial leverage for a given level of free cash
flow. Cordeiro (1993) reponed that parent fIrm abnormal returns from IV formation are also more favorable in the
presence of long-term performance plans and interlocking directorates.
This paper extends the agency perspective to examine the parent-fIrm wealth effects associated with a
specifIc form of venture evolution--partner buyouts. In this context, agency hazards can arise at the parent fInn
level due to the separation of parent fInn ownership and control or at the level of the venture due to coordination
problems arising from shared ownership and control. This paper considers the former agency problem by
emphasizing the conflicting interests of parent fIrm managers and shareholders regarding organizational growth
via venture buyouts. Following Wild (1994), our focus is on the parent fIrm's ownership structure, free cash flow,
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and capital structure. Since agency problems have been implicated in diversifying acquisitions (e.g., Amihud &
Lev, 1981; Lewellen, Loderer, & Rosenfeld, 1985; Morck & Yeung, 1992; Shleifer & Vishny, 1991) and recently
in N formations, agency hazards are also expected to influence investments of a sequential character such as N
internalizations.
The aim of this study is to join standard agency theory arguments and event study methodology to test a
contingency perspective on international joint venture (UV) buyouts. The evidence that Ns often terminate via
internalization4 suggests that the aggregate shareholder wealth effects associated with MNCs' sequential
investment stiategies employing IJVs may be substantial. While the termination of Ns has frequently been
assumed to indicate venture failure, we offer the altemative view that such strategic moves may create value for
parent firms in specific contexts.
While the hypotheses tested in this study can also apply in th~ domestic setting, the international context
for the research design is appropriate and interesting for two reasons. First, UVs have become an increasingly
management theorists in UV investments is therefore an important reason for our focus on UV buyouts. Second,
beginning with the pioneering work of Franko (1971), much of the theoretical and empirical work on N
ownership instability has been conducted in the international setting. Hence, focusing on UVs facilitates
comparability with previous research.
This paper begins by highlighting the most recent theoretical and empirical work in the area of N
ownership instability. Feasible evolutionary paths for Ns are identified in order to provide further motivation for
focusing on partner buyouts. Hypotheses drawn from agency theory are presented in the following section. These
hypotheses aid in identifying specific contexts in which UV buyouts should be value-enhancing or value-
destroying. A subsequent section discusses the data sources and the event study methodology used to test the
hypotheses. For the sample as a whole, our empirical findings do not reveal significant shareholder wealth effects
from IJV buyouts. However, abnormal returns are positively related to the parent firm's inside ownership and the
interaction of debt financing and free cash flow. Gains or losses from IN termination are thus context-dependent.
Following the presentation of empirical findings, the paper concludes by discussing results, limitations of the
study, and avenues for future research.
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JOINT VENTURE OWNERSIllP EVOLUTION
Focusing on joint venture evolution challenges prevailing notions of what constitutes venture success.
Theoretical and empirical research on Ns has often. explicitly or implicitly, characterized N ownership structure
changes as "failures" by emphasizing N longevity or survival as indicators of success (Hamel, 1991). Such
measures are appropriately applied in studies taking the N as the unit of analysis. but have the shortcoming of not
recognizing that venture evolution may produce unequal payoffs for the parent firms (Geringer & Hebert. 1991).
Focusing on the learning process in international alliances. Hamel takes issue with the use of longevity and
harmony as success metrics:
Where internalization [of the partner's skills] is the goal. the longevity and 'stability' of
partnerships may not be useful proxies for collaborative success... A long-lived alliance may
evince the failure of one or both partners to learn... [W]here a failure to learn is likely to
undermine the competitiveness and independence of the firm. such contentedness should not be
.. take~ as a·sign of collaborative success (1991: 101).
__ 0 , __ • .•_~ ._~__••_-_.- ••_-~ -~-------_._----.--_.~,--- - •••••.-.-----•.• -- ' •••.•_. _ •• ----.- ---.,~~.-.---••~----~-.------_.----- .-. --.----.- •••. ------ --- .-•.~••------.---- ---- --- --- --.----- •••• -.---.- •.----- .-
It must be clearly noted that longevity is an imperfect proxy for "alliance success." Longevity
can be associated. for instance. with the presence of high exit barriers. And in some alliances.
success can also be operationalized in terms of other measures such as profitability. market
share... Yet, achievement of these latter objectives can be thwarted by premature. unintended
dissolution of the [global strategic ~lliance]. Furthermore, objective performance measures (e.g.•
GSA survival and duration) are significantly and positively correlated with parent firms' report~d
(that is. subjective) satisfaction with GSA performance...• so that for many research purposes the
use oflongevity as a surrogate for a favorable GSA outcome is probably not too restrictive (1991:
582).
In a later empirical study. Parkhe (1993) found that the expected durability of an alliance is positively related to
profitability. the parent's overall performance assessment of the alliance, and favorable spillover effects on the
parent firm. but not the satisfaction of the parent corporation's strategic needs. Taken together these comments
suggest that it is problematic to associate N termination with failure. Where possible, parent firm performance
needs to be explicitly addressed in research on N ownership instability.
The lack of consensus in the literature regarding the relationship between N ownership instability and
performance also likely reflects empirical studies' aggregation of N instability types. For instance, Franko's
(1971) study examined MNCs' use oflNs as the parent t'irm progressed through multinational development
stages. He found that IN instability was caused by the MNC's desire to standardize global marketing policies and
rationalize production to eliminate intersubsidiary competition. The study aggregated three types of IN ownership
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instability (Le., increasing ownership to greater than 95%, increasing ownership from a minority interest to a
majority interest, and divestiture or liquidation) for analyses of corporate policies, industry effects, and country
effects. Consequently, one cannot infer how changing international strategies relate to partner-specific IN
ownership changes. Examples of other studies aggregating N instability types include Beamish (1985), Killing
(1983), and Park (1992).
The implicit assumption behind such pooling of ownership instability types is that the influence of
ownership determinants is invariant across different paths of N evolution. Furthermore, aggregating different
kinds of N ownership changes might also mask differences in performance effects across distinct types of N
instability. Kogut's (1989, 1991) research provides an example of the clarity that can be brought to earlier
empirical research aggregating N instability types. In contrast with previous research viewing N termination as
"failure," Kogut's (1991) emphasis on the option characteristics of Ns also points to the potential for capturing
value by shifting ownership structures. Partner buyout, when viewed as the exercise of a call option, can enhance
.----- - _._- ---- .._-- .__ -_.'.__.----.----_.- - -.-_._~ .._._--,.,--- -_.._--,~_._._-------_ .. _.-~ .._-.-..-._..-- -.._-•...•-----._._----- ._~._.. -_._------- ---_.._-'--.-
Figure 1 offers a framework for categorizing alternative paths along which a N's ownership structure
may evolve. This figure can be used to classify some of the recent literature on N instability and to illustrate why
aggregation of N ownership instability types can be problematic for theory development. Region 1 represents N
ownership stability, occurring when parents' ownership shares do not change during-the time horizon under
consideration. From the broader perspective of venture control, however, managing the N may be complicated by
relative bargaining power shifts not reflected in ownership shares. Such bargaining power shifts may arise as
competitive priorities change, environmental conditions prompting the initial N investment cease to exist, or one
partner appropriates the other's skills (Hamel, 1991). In fact, ownership stability may exacerbate conflict and
control problems if parents' specialized contributions to the N must change and rigidity in ownership stakes
prevents equitable sharing of the venture's profits as it evolves. Ultimately, however, such changes in the venture
may give rise to reorganization or other ownership instability types discussed below.
Insert Figure I About Here
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Regions 2 through 5 represent within-N ownership instability. Within-N ownership instability occurs
when parent firms' equity stakes change but both partners rerrutin invested in the venture. Regions 2 and 4
(
indicate asymmetric changes in ownership stakes. Representing symmetric changes in equity stakes, regions 3 and
5 are infeasible in two-parent Ns since changes in equity stakes are zero-sum. Simultaneous increases or
decreases in ownership for two focal parents are possible in Ns with three or more parents, however. One reason
Ns offer flexibility is that parent firms can readjust ownership in a N as the relationship and partner
contributions evolve (Chi, 1994). However, such negotiated changes in the N's ownership structure can also
increase ex post transaction costs. In a study of manufacturing and retailing N s, Blodgett (1992) found that
within-N ownership instability was more likely when there had been prior ownership renegotiations, when the N
operated in foreign markets with open investment climates, and when. there was an imbalance in parent firms'
initial equity stakes...
Finally, regions 6 through 9 represent discrete changes in N governance. This type of N instability
arises when the N ceases to exist as a separate entity for the original parent firms. Representative of region 6 is
the case when parent firm i converts a N to an internal unit, solely within its hierarchy, by acquiring its partner's
equity in the N. Region 8 is the mirror image, which occurs when parent firm i sells its stake in the venture to its
partner. For subsidiaries set up between 1900 and 1975, Gomes7Casseres (1987) reported that 26.9 percent of
majority-owned Ns became wholly-owned subsidiaries by 1975; and the proportion of INstransitioning to·
wholly-owned subsidiaries increased with greater initial ownership percentages. Kogut (1988a, 1991) found that
the likelihood of termination by acquisition differed by country and N function. Japanese Ns located in the U.S.
were more apt to terminate by acquisition, as were R&D ventures and Ns with marketing or distribution activities.
/
Ns in concentrated industries or those experiencing unexpectedly favorable growth were also more likely to
terminate by acquisition.
Region 7 is not feasible in two-parent Ns given the zero-sum nature of ownership changes. In Ns with
three or more parent firms, however, two parents may jointly acquire a third parent's stake.
Region 9 occurs when the N is divested by both parties or is liquidated. For subsidiaries established
between 1900 and 1975, Gomes-Casseres (1987) noted that 11.1 percent of INs were sold to outsiders or local
partners by 1975, and only 1.9 percent oflNs were liquidated by 1975. Kogut (1988a, 1991) observed that
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production-oriented Ns in unconcentrated industries are likely to terminate via dissolution rather than acquisition.
Finally, hybrid cases are also possible at the boundary of region 9 (Le., adjacent to regions 6 and 8) when one
parent sells its stake in an ongoing IN to an outside party.
The diversity of N evolutionary paths illustrated in Figure 1 and the empirical findings reviewed above
suggest the performance implications of N evolution are likely to be a function of the type of ownership evolution
for each partner, parent fInD attributes, and other contextual factors within and outside the exchange relationship.
This paper recognizes that performance implications may be quite different for alternative types of N termination
(e.g., regions 6-9). Hence, this study focuses on the internalization of an IN by one U.S. parent firm (Le., region
THEORY AND HYPOTHESES
The notion that managers pursue growth opportunities without regard for maximizing shareholder value
--------~--- ------ ----------- -----~- --- -- ----- - ------ ------- -- - -- - --------- ------ -- --
has existed in the literature for some time (e.g., Berle & Means, 1932). Agency theory posits that the separation of
firm ownership and control can result in suboptimal management decisions from the vantage point of shareholders.
For instance, agency theory has attributed poor acquisitions to managers' and shareholders' disparate objectives·
and risk preferences and shareholders' imperfect monitoring of managers (e.g., Amihud & Lev, 1981; Lewellen,
Loderer, & Rosenfeld, 1985; Morck & Yeung, 1992; Shleifer & Vishny, 1991). From a normative standpoint, the
theory suggests that such divergent interests can be brought into better alignment through various governance
mechanisms improving agent monitoring and incentives.s Factors generally considered influential in serving
shareholder interests include outcome-based controls, the disciplinary roles of the market for corporate control and
the managerial labor market, and the monitoring function served by the board of directors.
While these factors may improve the alignment between managers' and shareholders' interests, none of
them works perfectly or without cost. For example, if the managerial labor market perfectly used past performance
information in revising managers' salaries, managers' objectives would parallel those of shareholders, even in
corporations with diffuse ownership (Fama, 1980). Given imperfections in the monitoring and rewarding of
managers, however, a moral hazard prqblem arises because managers do not personally reap the full benefits nor
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bear the full costs of their decisions. Hence, Jensen and Meckling suggest that decreases in managerial ownership
can have adverse consequences for the fIrm's information gathering and investment decisions:
[I]t is likely that the most important conflict arises from the fact that as the manager's ownership
claim falls, his incentive to devote signifIcant effort to creative activities such as searching out
new profItable ventures falls. He may in fact avoid such ventures simply because it requires too
much trouble or effort on his part to manage or learn about new technologies. Avoidance of the
personal costs and the anxieties that go with them also represent a source of on the job utility to
him and it can result in the value of the fIrm being substantially lower than it otherwise would be
(1976: 313).
It follows from agency theory that the performance implications of N internalization decisions are
contingent on the acquiring firm's management incentives. The more the interests of managers converge with
those of shareholders, the lower the agency costS associated with self-serving behavior and agent monitoring. If
managers' compensation is inadequately tied to corporate performance, however, managerial motivations for
internalizing a N_may be at odds with those of shareholders. For example, managers might be less inclined to
take advantage of the coordination benefIts that N internalizations make possible. Managers may fail to transfer
- -- ------ ---- ~ -- --- ------ --- ---- ---_.. --'-~~--~'--- -'- -----------_..._-----_. ~------~-~:._.__._._- ---,~~'.~~-'::'--~~~-=,~~~---~_:=~~--=_-:.~~~.=.-_.~--~.=_.:=-~:=.~~-~-~-_ .._~.~~ ..
-------- -------technologIes-imd capabIHiles from-theliitemallzecfYen-lUre to'other business units, or they might not fully integrate
the newly-acquired N into the parent fIrm's structure and systems. When management incentives are misaligned
with shareholders' interests, managers may also neglect to acquire the most attractive Ns in the most timely
manner.
When management incentives are inadequate, managers may also be apt to internalize Ns that result in
wealth transfers from shareholders to managers. For example, inappropriate expansion and diversification through
N internalization can arise from the divergent risk preferences of managers and shareholders (e.g., Amihud &
Lev, 1981). In contrast to shareholders who can diversify investment risks at low transaction costs through
portfolio investments, managers have great diffIculty hedging the risks of central concern to them--compensation
and employment risks. This divergence of risk preferences takes on growing signifIcance as managerial incentives
weaken when the parent fIrm's ownership becomes more diffuse. Under such circumstances, N internalization
might be undertaken in part to reduce managers' compensation or employment risks. From the shareholders'
perspective, however, the purchase price of the N will be too large, possibly resulting in a negative-NPV
investment. Agency theory suggests that diversifying N formations and internalizations in high growth markets
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may partially reflect management's attempts to assure parent firm survival and provide attractive opportunities for
insiders rather than maximizing the value of the parent firm.
Agency theory therefore predicts that N internalizations will more likely be value-enhancing investments
when the interests of managers and shareholders are congruent. Firms with higher inside ownership are more apt
to engage in value-creating acquisitions (Lewellen, Loderer, & Rosenfeld, 1985) and participate in less
conglomerate merger activity (Arnihud & Lev, 1981). Morek and Yeung (1992) found that fmns' abnormal
returns from international acquisitions were positively related to inside ownership. More generally, firms with
higher inside ownership are likely to earn higher profits in high growth industries (Kesner, 1987) and earn higher
risk-adjusted returns (Oswald & Jahera, 1991) than firms with lower inside ownership. We:.therefore expect ,ih~
parent firm performance effects of IN internalization ,to be influenced by the parent firm's ownership strucwre.
. HI: Abnormal returns for the U.S. parent internalizing an UV will he positively related to the
U.S. parent's inside ownership percentage. .. .
consistent with shareholder objectives. While hypothesis one speaks to the role played by the firm's ownership
structure in aligning the incentives of managers and shareholders, it does not consider the role of management's
discretion in investment decisions. Agency theory contends that firms' investment decisions are also influenced by
the size of the pool of internally available funds (Le., slack resources).
Given abundant resources for investment activity, managers are apt to grow the firm beyond its optimal
size (Jensen, 1986). Ventures earning less than the firm's cost of capital may be initiated to increase the size of the
firm, particularly when rewards are given through promotions rather than bonuses, or when managers' power rises
significantly with increases in the resources under their control. Although external financial markets provide some
degree of monitori~gof investments for the sake of growth, managers can avoid such scrutiny if adequate resources
exist within the firm. Jensen (1986) contends that the oil industry of the 1970s provides a case in point. Given
increases in oil prices and slow industry growth, managers used internal ,funds to diversify outside of the industry
in some of the worst performing acquisitions of the 1970s. Takeovers and threats of takeover ultimately reduced
excess spending on exploration and development and led firms to pass on cash flows to shareholders.
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By contrast, ftnns with smaller available cash flows are less likely to engage in value-destroying venture
activity due to the scrutiny of external ftnancial markets. Such fInns tum to outside investors sooner or more
frequently in acquiring capital than ftrms with larger pools of internal funds. Instead of using cash flows on
negative net present value ventures, cash flows are provided to shareholders with superior investment
opportunities.
Similar to acquisitions and initial DV investments, DV buyouts may be influenced by the scarcity or
abundance of free cash flows. When internal funds are readily available, DV internalizations may be undertaken to
increase managers' personal control over activities in a foreign country or to rationalize the previous commitment
of funds to ~ particular market. Further, the ac9uisition of the partner'~~tak~may result in improved career .
opportunities and status for acquiring fIrm managers to the possible detriment of shareholders. Expanded foreign
direct investment may also diversify the ftrm's incom~ stream, thereby reducing managers' ~o~pensation risk.
However, international diversifIcation may not be value-enhancing from shareholders' perspective if the
-'--~---'---'-------~---"_.'---_._- - -' - _. _._---- ._-- - -----_._-.-_._-_.--_.._.- ...._•.- _.._._-_._._---,~ - ',."- - .- .,....... _---_._.... -_., ----------- -.~_..__._-_._--_._--_. __._._-_._---,-_._-----
international expansion does not leverage proprietary resources across markets (Morek & Yeung, 1992).
82: Abnormal returns for the U.S. parent internalizing an UV will be negatively related to the
U.S. parent firm's free cash flow.
Jensen's (1986) "control hypothesis" argues that the use of debt fInancing enables managers to promise
that future ~ash flows will be paid out rather than invested in wealth-destroying ventures. Bondholders provide a
disciplinary force because they have the legal right to take the fInn into bankruptcy if this obligation is not
fulftlled. The possibility of a fIrm failing to meet payments on its debt discourages managers from undertaking
investments that might adversely impact efftciency. It follows from Jensen's (1986) reasoning that increasing the
fInn's leverage attenuates the negative effect offree cash flow on abnonnal returns (H2). The fInn with a high
level of debt utilization for a given level oUree cash flow will be more apt to engage in value-creating N
investment decisioris.
H3: Abnormal returns for the U.S. parent internalizing an UV wiD be positively related to the
interaction of the U.S. parent finn's leverage and free cash flow.
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METHODOLOGY
A sample of IN internalization announcements was constructed using the section on U.S. investment
abroad contained in Mergers & Acquisitions for the seven-year period extending from the first quarter of 1988
through the fourth quarter of 1994. The M&A periodical provided information on the completion date, partner
names, the name of the IN, and the location of the IN. In order to appear in the dataset, a publicly-traded U.S.
parent firm must have acquired the remaining equity stake in a non-U.S. venture. Predicast's Funk & Scott Index
and the Wall Street Journal Index were used to augment the database and to obtain announcement dates for the IN
internalizations listed in M&A. When multiple announcements appeared for a particular IN internalization, the
earliest available date was used, and confounded announcements were not included in the analysis. When an
announcement date was not available from the F&S Index or the Wall Street Journal Index, the M&A completion
_date was used as a surrogate since this date was generally on, or one day prior to, the announcement date.
The following market model was used to obtain expected returns for each U.S. parent firm:
(1) ~t =~-+ ~iR:t~+fi;'- - ---- --- ----------- --- ------- ------------------ ----- -- -------------- ---- -.-
where Rit is the return on security i for day t, Rmt is the return of the value-weighted market portfolio (including all
distributions and excluding ADRs), and fit is the error term assumed to be independent across firms and time, and
normally distributed with mean zero and constant variance. Daily returns for each U.S. parent firm were obtained
from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) datafiles..CRSP also provided data on the value-weighted
market portfolio's returns. OLS parameter estimates were obtained by estimating equation (I) over the period t =
-250 to t = -50, where t = 0 corresponds to the event date. The length and placement of the estimation period was
chosen by considering recommendations that it be long enough for statistical accuracy and close to the event date
(e.g., Strong, 1992) and precedent in the N formation literature (e.g., Koh & Venkatraman, 1991).
Firm i's abnormal return for a given day within the event period is the difference between the firm's
actual return and the return predicted by equation (l):
where ARit is the abnormal return for firm i on day t, Rit and Rml are as defined above, and ll; and bi are the firm's
OLS parameter estimates from equation (I).
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In order to capture shareholder wealth effects attributable to the UV internalization, a five trading day




where 't and K were set at -2 and 2, respectively.
The significance of abnormal returns during the announcement period can be assessed through
standardization.6 Due to the possible influence of outlying abnormal returns, however, the nonparametric sign test
. _ _.(Siegel, 1956) .?I_as also used: _
(4) P-05N4= 05,fN
The test'statistic 4 follows a standard normal approximation to the binomial distribution under the null hypothesis
abnormal returns, and N is the sample size.
.To test the three hypotheses developed in the previous section, the following cross-sectional model was
estimated:
where OWN; is the percent of stock held by U.S. parent finn i's officers and directors. Data on inside ownership
were obtained from the Compact Disclosure CD-ROM package for the quarter closest to the internalization event.
U.S. parent firm i's free cash flow, FCFj , is estimated as income before extraordinary items plus depreciation and
amortization less capital expenditures, which is then scaled by dividing by the parent finn's market value on the
event date. LEVi is total liabilities divided by total assets for U.S. parent firm i. Finally, ASSETS j is the natural
logarithm of the U.S. parent firm's total assets (in millions of dollars), which is included to control for firm size.
Previous research has reported inconsistent findings on the influence of firm size. While larger firms are expected
to have smaller abnormal returns, provided gains from UV formations are symmetric, this hypothesis has often
been contradicted (e.g., Chen, Hu, & Shieh, 1991; Crutchley, Guo, & Hansen, 1991). Large size may also reflect
the presence of supporting resources or scale economies. An ideal control variable would be the size of the UV
13
~, ... .
internalization relative to parent firm size, yet insufficient data were available on IJV internalization size. Data on
free cash flow, liabilities, and assets were obtained from Compustat for the year prior to the internalization event.
Market value data used to scale free cash flow were obtained from the CRSP datafiles.
Equation (5) indicates free cash flow has both a direct and a leverage-moderated effect on abnormal
returns. The total effect of free cash flow on abnormal returns is given by the partial derivative of equation (5)
with respect to free cash flow (Le., lh + ~4LEVi)' This expression indicates that the relation of free cash flow on
abnormal returns is modeled as a linear function of leverage.
Prior empirical research has examined the possibility of a nonlinear relation between inside ownership
and corporate performance. For example, Morek, Shleifer, and Vishny (1988) found ahonliriear and
nonmonotonic relation between board ownership and Tobin's Q. Indicator variables were defined for the three
categories of internal ownership, asidentified by Morek, Shleifer, and Vishny (1988):
01 =1 ifOWNi~ .05,
03 =1 if OWNi > .25.
In each case, the indicator variable took on a value of 0 if the stated condition was not met. The following variant
of model (5) was also estimated:
~sASSETSi+ Gt.
Apart from the interaction effects between inside ownership and inside ownership indicator variables, regressors
are the same as in equation (5). This methodology avoids the biases introduced into parameter estimates using the
approach taken by Morek, Shleifer, and Vishny (1988) and Wild (1994),7 A hierarchical F-test based on the
overall fit of equation (5') relative to the constrained model (Le., equation 5) provides a test for the hypothesis that
the effect of inside ownership on UV internalization valuation effects is identical across the three inside ownership
categories (Le., 1311 =~12 =1313).8
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RESULTS
During the seven-year horizon considered, daily stqck returns data were available for parent firms
internalizing 88 INs. After merging firms' stock returns data and the ownership and financial information
obtained from Compact Disclosure and Compustat, 75 IN internalizations remained in the dataseL The sample
contains U.S. parent fIrms operating in 23 different primary industriesat the two-digit SIC code level. Forty
percent of the parent firms operated in manufacturing industries in SIC codes 3000-3999. The INs internalized
by U.S. parent firms were located in 23 different countries.
Table I provides descriptive statistics and correlations for the variables in equation (5). The average
inside ownership percentage is'5~03 percent, and ranges from a low of 0.04 percent to a high of 42.0 'percent. The
average firm had a leverage ratio of 0.61 and free cash flow equal to 2.87 percent of market value. Table I
indicates average total assets of $8.58 billion. The correlation matrix reveals that more highly-leveraged firms and
larger firms tend to have lower inside ownership.
------- -~--- --_. ---~---. - - ..--_.----------- -- -- .-.----_. - -. ----- - . -.--------- ._- --~-_._--- ---_._---- -- ---- ---~---------------_.---- -~--_._-_._------ . -
Insert Table I About Here
Table 2 provides results on the valuation effects associated with IN internalization. The table indicates
that the average cumulative valuation effect of IN internalization is not statistically different from zero for the
five-day window. The proportion of firms experiencing positive abnormal returns on any given day ranges from
0.386 to 0.534. While none of the mean cumulative abnormal returns are significantly different from zero, the
nonparametric sign test shows that the proportion of negative returns is signifIcantly more than 50 percent on
trading days t = 1 and t = 2 (p < 0.05). The proportion of fIrms obtaining a positive cumulative abnormal return
over the entire announcement interval is 45.5 percenL The mean cumulative abnormal return is -0.299 percent for
the fIve-day returns window. CARs range from a low of -9.23 percent to a high of 10.8 percent. These fIndings
indicate no general pattern regarding the ex ante performance implications of IN termination. Even after
controlling for the mode of IN termination, shareholder valuation effects are mixed.
Insert Table 2 About Here
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Table 3 presents the regression results for models (5) and (5'). Initial estimation of these two equations
revealed multicollinearity due to the correlation between the free cash flow main effect and the interaction term.
Variance inflation factors (VIPs) for these two regressors were 33.2 and 32.8, respectively, much higher than the
rule of thumb upper bound of ten (Neter, Wasserrnan, & Kutner, 1990). In order to correct this problem,
Cronbach's (1987) centering procedure was used whereby the means for free cash flow and leverage were
subtracted from the direct effects prior to forming the multiplicative term. VIPs for the mean-differenced free cash
flow and interaction variables were 1.1 and 1.2, respectively. Following the correction for multicollinearity,
regression diagnostics obtained from estimating equations (5) and (5') also indicated outlier observations. Two
outlier obserVations witlistudentizedresiduals exceeding 2.5 in absolute value were eliminated from the analysis.9
. -- - - - -. -
Table 3 presents the results of the two regression models after corrections were made for multicollinearity and
outlier observations..
- ---.- ..-- --Insert-Table-3About-Here·-----·_···-_·.--
The regression results indicate support for the hypothesis that abnormal returns from IN internalization
are positively related to the U.S. parent ftnn's inside ownership percentage. The model using the inside ownership
percentage variable (equation 5) demonstrated a positive relation. The regression results for equation (5') suggest
that the positive relationship between inside ownership and valuation effects holds only in the 25-100 percent
range. However, the F-test comparing the full and reduced models indicates the coefftcients do not differ
signiftcantly across ownership categories (i.e., F(2, 65) = 0.179, p > 0.10). A piecewise linear regression model
allowing intercept terms and ownership coefftcients to differ across ownership categories produced the same
insigniftcant result. These findings may be driven in part by the small sample sizes in the highest two ownership
categories, however. Only three Ns had a U.S. parent firm with an inside ownership percentage in the 25-100
percent range. Seventeen Ns had a U.S. parent ftrm with an inside ownership percentage in the 5-25 percent
range. The finding of a positive relationship between inside ownership and IN internalization valuation effects
parallels previous work noting the positive performance effects of inside ownership for N formations (Cordeiro,
1993; Wild, 1994) and acquisitions (e.g., Lewellen, Loderer, & Rosenfeld, 1985; Morek & Yeung, 1992).
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In order to assess the influence of free cash flow on valuation effects, equations (5) and (5') were
estimated by dropping the free cash flow main effect and the multiplicative term.10 In both cases the hierarchical
F-value was significant at slightly more than the five percent significance level (Le., F(2, 67) =2.80 and F(2, 65) =
2.86, respectively). Examination of the relative magnitudes of the free cash flow main effect and interaction term
indicates the interaction effect dominates the relation with abnormal returns. Differentiating equation (5) with
respect to free cash flow and substituting the OLS parameter estimates, we find:
(6) acARK,t = 0.0007 + 0.481LEV.
dFCF
Recalling that LEV has been~~ntered about !ts.melUl, it can be shown that free cash flow is negatively related to
- .." shareholder wealth effects whim leverage is less than 0.610." Applying the same analysis to equation (5') yields
. an equivalent result. The median leverage ratio is 0.617 for this sample, indicating a negative relation for roughly
-haIf of the parent firms. Equivalently, the relation between free cash flow and abnormal returns is negative for·
Hence, contrary to H2, the results suggest no general relation between free cash flow and abnormal returns
from IN buyouts. Rather, the effects of free cash flow on returns are contingent on financial leverage. Support for
this contingent relation is consistent with hypothesis 3. In both equations (5) and (5'), the positive interaction term
coefficient is significantly different from zero at the five percent significance level. This interaction indicates that
for a given level of free cash flow, abnormal returns rise with the parent firm's financial leverage. Jensen's (1986)
"control hypothesis" appears to apply to IN internalizations as well as initial IN investments.
The coefficient on firm size is positive in both models, but is significant at the ten percent significance
level for equation (5) only. This result contrasts previous empirical studies of IV formations (Koh &
Venkatraman, 1991; McConnell & Nantell, 1985) finding that larger parent fIrms obtain smaller abnormal returns.
As a check on the robustness of the results, equations (5) and (5') were also estimate9 using three- (t =-I,
0, l) and four-day (t =-2, -1,0, l) event windows for cumulative abnormal returns. Inside ownership had a
positive and signifIcant effect (p<.03) on parent fIrm valuation effects in the four-day model, but was not
signifIcant (at the .10 level) in the three-day model. As before, the effect of ownership was identical across
ownership categories. The interaction effect of leverage and free cash flow was positive and significant in both
17
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models (p<.03 and iK.07, respectively), and F-tests indicated that the total effect of free cash flow was significant
in both models (p<.Ol and p<.07, respectively). Size was marginally significant (p<.lO) and positively signed in
the four-day model.
DISCUSSION
Recent empirical research by Cordeiro (1993) and Wild (1994) applied agency theory and event study
methodology to isolate the sources of firm value changes resulting from N formation. This paper examined the
ownership structure, free cash flow, and control hypotheses of Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Jensen (1986) in
.the context of IJV internalizations. Agency theory has been found useful in explairung .investinent decision-
behavior in acquisitions and IJV formations as well as the sources of stockholder wealth effects resulting from
these investments. Given that joint ventures are often stepping stones to greater market c0rmnitment through a
partner's buyout of the venture, this paper has sought to determine if IN internalization is similarly subject to
•..._~---~~-_..._._- --- ~-_.-.--_._.~--~ -_._--_.•_---_..._••--~- +-----' _ •• - --------_._-----_._._. _.~ --_._.__.- .---. '-" -~ +--_.~.. _----..._-_._ .. - ._-------------
--.~-.---.--'agency-hazards. ._.---.-- ......__.
This research challenges two basic assumptions in prior N research. First, we questioned N researchers'
undifferentiated treatment of alternative N ownership changes. Future N research will benefit from clearly
defining the scope of N ownership changes in studies considering N ownership evolution and parent firm
performance effects. While our focus was on venture partner buyouts, Figure 1 offers a taxonomy for
distinguishing possible N ownership changes. Future research might expl~citly test for differential performance
effects across N instability types. Future empirical work might also investigate potential asymmetries in parent
firm performance effects; which were not examined here due to data limitations.
Second, this research sought to theoretically and empirically examine whether N termination is
indicative of failure. The empirical findings provide no general evidence that termination of IJVs through partner
buyouts constitutes failure, at least not if failure is defined in terms of negative abnormal returns to the acquiring
firm. The empirical evidence indicates no general case for wealth creation or destruction associated with venture
internalization. On average, the parent firm valuation effects of IN internalization were not significantly different
from zero. The empirical evidence that the performance implications of IN termination vary, even after
controlling for the termination mode, cautions against interpreting N termination as collaborative failure.
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Variables drawn from agency theory aided in determining the sources of shareholder wealth effects. Like
acquisitions and N formations, IN internalization is subject to agency hazards. This finding held despite the
many possible motivations for internalizing Ns in the international environment (e.g., differences in legal
regimes, competitive environments, and cultures) which might have overwhelmed the effects postulated by agency
theory.
Ownership structure, the existence of resources which may be invested in suboptimal ventures, and the
monitoring role of debt all influence the valuation effects on U.S. parent firms' shareholders. Following empirical
work on acquisitions and N formations, the study found that stock market reactions to IN internalization
decisions depend on the extent to which managerial andsh~eholderi!lterestsare!Uig!le<l~ ~en insider's have a
high stake in the U.S. parent firm or when opportunities to waste internal resources are limited (due to high
financial}everage), the valuation effects associated with IN internalization ar~ lik~ly to be positive.
The finding that the influence of inside ownership on parent firm valuation effects is constant across
ownership categories contrasts Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny's (1988) finding that Tobin's Q is nonmonotonically
related to inside ownership. This discrepancy in empirical resultscan be explained by the fact that our empirical
analysis considers market value changes associated with a specific investment decision, IN internalization, rather
than the cumulative effect of all firm investment decisions and other factors on market valuation (Le., Tobin's Q).
However, Morck and Yeung (1992) found evidence for managerial entrenchment effects on international
acquisitions. Abnormal returns were smaller when insiders owned greater than twenty percent of the acquiring
firm's equity. Although care should be taken in interpreting the significance of inside ownership in our individual
ownership categories, we find no evidence of entrenchment in IN internalization decisions.
These empirical findings may also inform N research based on option theory and other theoretical work
considering the performance implications of N investment decisions. For instance, Kogut (1991) portrayed Ns as
real options to expand through the acquisition of the partner's equity in a venture. If market demand proves
unfavorable, the firm is not compelled to expand. However, if demand proves unexpectedly favorable, the firm can
exercise its call option by acquiring the partner's equity stake. Kogut (1991) found support for this hypothesis
through an event history analysis of manufacturing Ns. The empirical evidence from the present study suggests
agency theory considerations moderate the willingness of managers to engage in value-creating venture buyouts.
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The exercise of call options on Ns is most likely to be value-enhancing when management incentives are aligned
with shareholder interests and financial leverage limits managers' discretionary use of free cash flows. Analysis of
alternative theoretical perspectives in domestic and international settings should provide valuable extensions to this
study.
___ ... , .•. __ • .__ .. .. __ . ~. __ .. . .~ . .__' .__ .• _.. ~ . • . .• 0-._.-
- - 0 - __~ ~~ • __ ---
_. __ .-- -_.. --_.-._-_." - - -_. ------------_.. _--- -- ---~----- -
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ENDNOTES
I Representative studies include Balakrishnan and Koza (1993); Chen, Hu, and Shieh (1991); Crutchley, Guo, and
Hansen (1991); Koh and Venkatraman (1991); Lurnrner and McConnell (1990); and McConnell and Nantell
(1985).
2 See, for example, Blodgett (1991, 1992); Gomes-Casseres (1987); Harrigan (1985, 1986, 1988); Killing (1983);
Kogut (1988a, 1989, 1991); Li (1995); Mitchell and Singh (1992); and Pennings, Barkema, and Douma (1994).
3 See, for example, Anderson (1990); Brown, Rugman, and Verbeke (1989); Dymsza (1988); Parkhe (1991); Ring
and Van de Ven (1994); and Teece (1992).
4 See Bleeke and Ernst (1993), Gomes-Clisseies (1987), Kogut (1988a, 1988b, 1989, 1991), arid Mitchell and
Singh (1992).
5See EiseDhardt (1989) for a review of agency theory's prospects in the management literature.
error of the forecast:
T
. (1) SARil = ARill [Si{l + (1m + [(Rml - Rni I I (Rmj- Rm)2]} 112],
.f4
where Si is the estimated residual variance from the market model regression for security i, Tis the number of days
in the estimation period, Rm, is the market return for period t within the event period, Rmis the mean market return
during the estimation period, and Rmj is the market return for period j within the estimation period. Assuming the
average standardized abnormal return (ASAR,) is asymptotically normal with variance lIN, where N is the number
of IN internalizations, a z-test can be performed on the statistic IN *ASAR, for long estimation periods.
Accumulating standardized abnormal returns for each firm i over d (Le., d =IC - t + 1) days yields the following:
1C
(2) CSAR~~.IC = (11 Jd) ISAR jt
t='t
Assuming that SARs are independent across time and securities, the mean cumulative standard abnormal return,
CAS~.IC' is calculated and a z-test can similarly be performed on the statistic.JN * CASAR~.IC'
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7 Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1988) and Wild (1994) estimated corporate performance in different research








inside ownership percentage (OWN j ) if OWN j < O.OS,
O.OS if OWNj ~ O.OS;
oif OWN; < O.OS,
(OWNj - O.OS) if O.OS ::; OWNj ::; 0.2S,
0.20 if OWNj > 0.2S;
oif OWNj < 0.2S,
(OWN j - 0.2S) if OWN j ~ 0.2S.
The coding of firms in higher ownership categories as nonzero values biases the coefficient estimates for firms in
the OWNO_S and OWNS_2S categories.
.. _.. .
8 If the coefficients for inside ownership are identical across the three ownership categories: then eq~ati~~(S')
Th I ~~ . . F* SSE(5)":'SSE(S') SSE(S') & II : F d' 'b' ·threduces to equation (S). ~e re evant test statistic, = dfs _ dfs' +.df
s
!o ows an ~ - IStn 4t10n WI
error sum of squares for equation (S') and dfs and dfs' are the respective degrees of freedom (see Neter,
Wasserman, & Kutner, 1990).
l
9 A plot of predicted values and residuals revealed no heteroscedasticity.
10 See Kmenta (1986: S08-S09) for an explanation of the F-test for total effects of variables included in interaction
terms.
II Setting equation (6) equal to zero and solving for LEV, wehave LEV = (-0.0007/0.481) + 0.611 = 0.610.
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TABLE 1
Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlationsa
Correlations \Variable Mean Std. Dev. (1) (2) (3) (4)
(1) CAR -0.003 0.034
(2) OWN 0.050 0.087 0.219t
(3) FCF 0.029 0.134 0.023 0.068
(4) LEV 0.611 0.180 -0.076 ~0.193t -0.111
- -
(5) ASSETSb 8557.5 10178 0.060 -0.349** 0.038 0.173
a N= 75.
b Mean, standard deviation, and correlations calculated based on actual dollar values in millions, rather




*** P < 0.001
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TABLE 2
Acquiring Finn Valuation Effects ofUV Internalizationc
Mean Abnonnal Mean Percent with
Event Day Return (%) CARz., (%) Positive AR's
-2 0.165 0.165 53.41
-1 0.183 0.348 48.86
0 -0.063 0.285 42.05
-0.338* -0.053 40.91
-- ~-. -~-_.'- - ----- .. - - .. _._-
2 -0.247 -0.299 38.64
"N= 88.
t p < 0.10
--- --- -- --- - _. - ----~- -*.- -p< O.O.? '-''-
** p < 0.01








































d Standard errors appear in parentheses.
t p < 0.10
* P <0.05
** p < 0.01









Possible Types of Ownership Evolution
in Two-Parent Joint Ventures
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Increase
Parent j Ownership
Decrease
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